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Abstract. Current low-level exploits often rely on code-reuse, whereby
short sections of code (gadgets) are chained together into a coherent ex-
ploit that can be executed without the need to inject any code. Several
protection mechanisms attempt to eliminate this attack vector by ap-
plying code transformations to reduce the number of available gadgets.
Nevertheless, it has emerged that the residual gadgets can still be suf-
ficient to conduct a successful attack. Crucially, the lack of a common
metric for “gadget quality” hinders the effective comparison of current
mitigations.
This work proposes four metrics that assign scores to a set of gadgets,
measuring quality, usefulness, and practicality. We apply these metrics to
binaries produced when compiling programs for architectures implement-
ing Intel’s recent MPX CPU extensions. Our results demonstrate a 17%
increase in useful gadgets in MPX binaries, and a decrease in side-effects
and preconditions, making them better suited for ROP attacks.
Keywords: ROP · gadgets · exploit · CFI · MPX · metrics
1 Introduction
Several mitigation techniques guarding against control-flow attacks have been
developed over the past 15 years. In contrast to modern-day attacks [6,7,10,11,
14,17,25,26,30,31], the attacks of the 90s [19] were simple. The latter typically
exploited a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability to overwrite a stack frame’s
return address with another that points to a location at which the attacker had
previously injected malicious code. On returning from the compromised function,
execution would consequently be redirected to the injected code block.
Since the early 2000s, the prevalent processor architectures have adopted
the No-eXecute (NX bit) extensions. These allow an operating system to mark
memory pages that only contain data (namely the heap and stack) as being
non-executable [18], thus stopping code-injection attacks. However, programs
⋆ At the time this research was conducted Eric Bodden was at Fraunhofer SIT and
TU Darmstadt.
may need to be able to allocate executable memory, for example for just-in-
time compilation [3]. For such cases, the operating system provides several API
calls that can change the memory protection level of a memory area (e.g.,
VirtualProtect4 on Windows). These API calls were quickly abused by at-
tackers, who would leverage them to change the access privileges of a region of
memory where they had previously injected their payload. To circumvent the
NX bit protection and to execute the API calls which change the memory pro-
tection of the payload code to executable, current exploits reuse executable code
snippets, or gadgets, comprising code from the running program and loaded li-
braries. Such attacks are known as code-reuse attacks, the most popular and
widespread technique being Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) [24, 29].
The difficulty of staging a ROP attack in practice is subject to an attacker’s
concrete aims, the underlying environment, and the available gadgets. The latter,
in particular, varies enormously between binaries. However, there is currently no
established metric for quantifying the utility of gadgets within a given binary.
Having such a metric would enable the comparison of gadgets in various kinds of
transformed binaries, e.g., different optimization levels of compilers, or binaries
that have been rewritten to add instructions for exploit mitigation. Currently,
many tools that produce such binaries, even those meant to enhance a binary’s
security, do not take into account how their transformation affects ROP gadgets.
Especially for exploit-mitigation techniques this is counterproductive: if a mit-
igation technique transforms code, how does one know that it does not in the
end increase a binary’s attack surface by adding useful gadgets?
This work presents four metrics based on practical exploit development, that
are designed to aid researchers in the evaluation of mitigations. More generally,
these metrics allow one to determine whether a binary transformation introduces
gadgets that are better suited for ROP attacks than the original binary.
Since it is somewhat difficult to make statements about the usefulness of
a set of gadgets without knowing the goal of the attacker and the underlying
environment, the metrics cover two targeted, real-world exploitation scenarios,
and two more general computations which reflect gadget variety and gadget
usability. This work further applies the metrics to binaries protected by MPX
(Memory Protection eXtensions) [23], a new buffer-overflowmitigation technique
from Intel that adds instrumentation code to binaries through the compiler. As
our evaluation shows, MPX-enabled binaries actually do contain more useful
gadgets, and thereby increase the attack surface. This is particularly worrysome
when running MPX-enabled binaries on legacy hardware that cannot benefit
from the increased security that MPX is designed to offer. To summarize, our
key contributions are:
– a definition of four metrics to measure gadget quality,
– GaLity, an open-source implementation to compute metrics on sets of gad-
gets, and
– a case study using the metrics to determine how MPX affects gadgets on
eight representative Windows x64 binaries.
4 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa366898%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the
necessity to evaluate gadget quality. Section 3 describes the proposed metrics.
Section 4 explains the conducted case study on MPX. Section 5 covers related
work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no metric to assess the quality of a
gadget or a set of gadgets. Such a metric, however, has a large variety of use cases.
For example, it could be used to compare different control-flow integrity (CFI) [2]
approaches. Today’s CFI implementations [9, 20, 21, 32–34] often use a metric
which measures the reduction of gadgets (such as AIR, the average indirect target
reduction [34], or DAIR, the dynamic average indirect target reduction [21]) to
compare their results. For many approaches, this metric shows a reduction of
over 99%, yet this does not take into consideration the total number of gadgets,
nor the quality of the remaining gadgets, limiting the metric’s practical use. A
DAIR of 90% that leaves 50 gadgets with many side effects and preconditions
intact is likely more secure than a DAIR of 99.5%, that leaves intact exactly those
7 gadgets that an attacker requires to craft an exploit. Researchers using those
metrics frequently acknowledge their limitations and the difficulty of developing
a metric that measures gadget quality [6, 21, 32].
In general, attackers favour simple gadgets which have a minimum of side
effects and preconditions. For example, consider a gadget that loads the value
that rsp points to into rax. A clean and effective gadget for achieving this would
be: pop rax ; ret. In contrast, the gadget: pop rax ; push rsp ; pop rbp
; mov [rdi+0x34fa], rsp ; ret 0x2dbf1 will also achieve this aim, but will
also have the side-effect of overwriting rbp. In addition, this gadget has the
precondition that rdi+0x34fa has to point to writeable memory. Finally, ret
0x2dbf1 not only adds a large offset to rsp (which can be an issue if attacker-
controlled memory is scarce, because it might set rsp to point outside of the
allocated memory), it also disaligns the stack pointer, which is something normal
programs do not do, hinting at a possible exploit execution. The next Section
presents the four metrics we propose to compute gadget quality.
3 Metrics for Measuring Gadget Quality
In general, evaluating the quality of a set of gadgets is non-trivial. This stems
primarily from the fact that an attacker’s goal is potentially unknown, and that
given sufficient gadgets, one can construct practically any program. In addition,
the gadgets required for an attacker to achieve a goal vary by operating system
and architecture. For example, on Windows x86, parameters to functions are
usually passed on the stack, while on Windows x64, the first four parameters
are passed through registers and all remaining ones are passed on the stack5,
5 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff561499%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
leading to differences in gadget requirements. As a running example, we consider
exploits targeting VirtualProtect, which is an API call that commonly serves
as an avenue to bypassing NX protection on Windows 7 x64 [12, 16, 22]. We
stress that our four metrics are not bound to evaluating this specific API call, as
they consider the more general attack setup and execution procedures associated
with ROP exploits. In addition, we perform an in-depth analysis of the various
properties of gadgets with respect to their side effects, preconditions, usability,
and usefulness.
3.1 Metric 1: Gadget Distribution
The gadget distribution metric is calculated by partitioning a given set of gad-
gets into twelve broad categories, with each category representing a class of
operations, such as arithmetic and data move, as shown in Table 1. Gadgets
are assigned to a category based on the first instruction of a gadget. For ex-
ample, the gadget add rax, 0x40 ; pop rcx ; ret would be assigned to the
arithmetic category. We categorize on the basis of the first instruction as every
suffix of a gadget is itself a gadget, and will be categorized separately. Note that
gadgets containing privileged or sensitive instructions [1] are discarded and not
considered in further steps because they trap in user mode, thereby making a
gadget unusable.
Analyzing the distribution of frequencies of gadgets amongst categories is
helpful as it allows comparing whether the distribution of gadgets in a trans-
formed binary is similar to the one in the original binary, or if the number
of gadgets in a category useful for an attacker has grown. Gadget quality and
usefulness, however, are not measured and addressed by the remaining metrics.
While Table 1 does not contain all instructions of the x86-64 instruction set,
it covers 99% of the instructions found in gadgets of the binaries we used in
the evaluation, i.e., a total of 20 MiB containing over one million instructions.
Due to the large size of the x86-64 instruction set (over 700 instructions [1]), it
would be a time-consuming, manual process to cover all existing instructions.
However, the fact that we do not achieve 100% coverage does not pose a threat to
the metric, because all important and common instructions are categorized. The
few we we did not include do not have a big impact on the overall distribution.
A manual inspection of uncategorized instructions in other binaries (we used
several Windows 7 system libraries) revealed that there were many different
instructions but in small numbers in any of the inspected binaries, which is
what we expected.
Metric 1 allows to assess whether a transformed binary contains more gad-
gets in categories useful to an attacker.
6 It might appear peculiar that xor, neg, not are in the arithmetic category - how-
ever, this is how exploit developers often use these instructions. Since using nullbytes
is sometimes prohibited by the environment, writing the negated or xor-ed value in
memory, loading it to a register and then using the same operation on it again is
used to bypass this restriction.
Table 1. Gadget Categories
Category Included Instructions
Data move pop, push, mov, xchg, lea, cmov, movabs
Arithmetic add, sub, inc, dec, sbb, adc, mul, div, imul, idiv, xor,
neg, not6
Logic cmp, and, or, test
Control flow call, sysenter, enter, int, jmp, je, jne, jo, jp, js,
lcall, ljmp, jg, jge, ja, jae, jb, jbe, jl, jle, jno, jnp,
jns, loop, jrcxz
Shift & Rotate shl, shr, sar, sal, ror, rol, rcr, rcl
Setting flags xlatb, std, stc, lahf, cwde, cmc, cld, clc, cdq
String stosd, stosb, scas, salc, sahf, lods, movs
Floating point divps, mulps, movups, movaps, addps, rcpss, sqrtss, maxps,
minps, andps, orps, xorps, cmpps, vsubpd, vpsubsb, vmulss,
vminsd, ucomiss, subss, subps, subsd, divss, addss,
addsd, cvtpi2ps, cvtps2pd, cvtsd2ss, cvtsi2sd, cvtsi2ss,
cvtss2sd, mulsd, mulss, fmul, fdiv, fcomp, fadd
Misc wait, set, leave
MMX pxor, movd, movq
NOP nop
RET ret
3.2 Metric 2: Gadget Environment Setup Capabilities
When constructing a ROP exploit, an attacker must be able to prepare the en-
vironment and operands for subsequent gadgets in a chain. For example, when
attempting to perform a Windows API call via ROP, an attacker will generally
require the ability to specify the call’s arguments. The degree of ease with which
an attacker may manipulate memory will affect the choice of gadgets that she
uses. In this metric, we consider the most general case, whereby an attacker is
able to inject arbitrary arguments into a target program’s memory space at a
known location. This could be possible due to, e.g., a browser with Javascript
turned on, allowing heap sprays and Heap Feng Shui [31], and other vulnerabil-
ities like information leaks [28]. We further assume the vulnerable program is
running on a Windows 7 x64 machine, which is a very common platform.
Consider the case whereby an attacker wants to invoke VirtualProtect,
which takes four arguments. On the aforementioned target platform, the first
four parameters are passed through registers (rcx, rdx, r8, r9). In such a
scenario, an attacker needs to make sure that those registers contain the correct
values before VirtualProtect can be invoked. To achieve that, three different
kinds of gadgets are required, namely: (i) a stack pivot gadget which points rsp to
the injected data, i.e., function arguments and addresses of gadgets, (ii) gadgets
to load the arguments from memory to the appropriate registers, and (iii) a
gadget that calls VirtualProtect.
This metric looks for gadgets that achieve these goals and distinguishes be-
tween gadgets that achieve only the required task or include other instructions.
Of course, our tool reports gadgets only if the register that receives the argument
is preserved, i.e., not overwritten by another instruction in the same gadget. In
case the attacker wants to invoke an API that requires fewer arguments, like
VirtualAlloc7, fewer gadgets that load arguments are required.
A gadget is only useful in preparing a destination register rd for use within a
ROP chain if it does not destroy its value prior to returning. More concretely,
consider a gadget consisting of a sequence of n instructions i0; i1; . . . in−1; ret.
If i0 assigns the value to rd, any subsequent instruction ik with k > 0 that has
rd as a target operand and falls within the data move, arithmetic, or shift and
rotate categories is tagged as being potentially destructive. A second refinement
step is subsequently carried out, whereby the quirks of the target architecture
are taken into account. For instance, instructions that output to a 32 bit subreg-
ister are handled differently than those that output to 16 or 8 bit subregisters.
This is due to the behaviour that writing to a 32 bit subregister automatically
zero-extends the value to fill the entire 64 bit register [1].
In the case of exploits making use of VirtualProtect, one finds that three
of the four arguments that this API call takes (namely lpAddress, the start
address of the memory region whose protection level is to be changed, dsSize,
the size address of the memory region whose protection level is to be changed, and
lpflOldProtect, an address where the old protection level will be stored) do not
need to be precise. If lpAddress is a few bytes off an attacker can take this into
account, just like a slightly smaller or larger size argument. lpflOldProtect is
not used by an attacker and can therefore be written to any location. Therefore,
the metric only deems two instructions destructive, namely pop and mov in 64
bit or 32 bit subregisters, as they overwrite the whole register. Metric 2 allows
one to assess whether a transformed binary contains gadgets typically required
for an attack where the environment gives the attacker a lot of leeway.
3.3 Metric 3: Gadget Environment Setup Capabilities - Restricted
In contrast to the previous metric, this metric considers the case where an at-
tacker is restricted in the ways in which she can inject values into memory. In
particular, we consider the scenario where an attacker may only inject data and
hijack the control-flow via strcpy. This complicates the direct injection of val-
ues into memory because many parameters to API calls often contain null-bytes,
which terminate strings, thus requiring that the arguments to be used for cor-
rectly invoking a function such as VirtualProtect be calculated dynamically at
runtime. Imagine an attacker wants to indeed invoke VirtualProtect. By tak-
ing a look at the required parameters it becomes clear that many will contain
null-bytes: lpAddress should point to the payload. Depending on the memory
layout, this address may contain null-bytes (e.g., in a classic stack buffer overflow
vulnerability on Windows, stacks are located at very low addresses making it
7 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa366887%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
very likely for the address to have its leftmost bytes set to null). dwSize must
not be too large, i.e., lpAddress + dwSize must include only mapped pages.
The value must also not be too small, as it has to cover the memory area where
the payload is injected. Typically, the value is a couple of thousand bytes or
smaller, which is a value that cannot be injected directly. flNewProtect is usu-
ally set to 0x40, which cannot be injected directly because the leftmost bytes
are null,and requires to be computed at runtime. lpflOldProtect will receive
the old protection value, hence must point to writable memory, which may con-
tain null-bytes. This example shows that in a scenario where the attacker is
restricted, she will require various arithmetic and data-move gadgets in order to
dynamically calculate parameters for API calls using gadgets.
The metric gauges the presence of gadgets that may be used to assist in
evaluating values dynamically at runtime, specifically gadgets that move data
between memory and registers and compute values: pop, push, add, sub, adc,
dec, inc, neg, not, mov, sbb, xchg, xor. As in the case of Metric 2, a gadget
is only considered if rd is preserved. Metric 3 allows one to assess whether a
transformed binary contains gadgets typically required for an attack where the
attacker has to make many calculations at runtime and cannot inject arbitrary
data into a program.
3.4 Metric 4: Gadget Quality
The aforementioned metrics do not measure the quality of a gadget per se,
rather they provide an indication whether a specific attack can succeed given
a set of gadgets. This metric focuses on assessing the quality of an individual
gadget, whereby a high-quality gadget is defined as one having no preconditions
or side-effects on other registers or memory. An example of a precondition is
that a specific register has to point to writeable memory, e.g., in the gadget
pop rax ; mov [rdi+0x34fa], rsp ; ret. To be usable, rdi+0x34fa must
point to writeable memory. A side-effect is, for example, that data in another
register is overwritten or the stack pointer is manipulated in a way that is difficult
to undo, e.g., in the gadget pop rax ; mov rcx, 0xb0adffff ; leave ; ret.
This gadget overwrites the values in rcx, rsp, and rbp. To express gadget quality,
a score is calculated for every gadget considered useful (see Metric 3 ). The score
starts at 0 and is increased for side-effects and preconditions. Therefore, a higher
score equals worse gadget quality. In the following we give a high-level overview
of the two criteria we use to calculate the score for gadget quality.
Grading Instructions To measure side-effects and preconditions, the metric
inspects every instruction in a gadget. It reuses the categories introduced in
Section 3.1 and assigns a score to each category, which reflects how destructive
the instructions in the respective category are. Table 2 summarizes the scoring
system. Depending on the destination of the instruction, we apply a modifier
to the originally assigned score. The metric recognizes three possible kinds of
destinations: rsp, which should ideally not be modified, because it is responsible
for the control flow and always needs to point to the next gadget. Therefore,
modifications of rsp usually have the largest influence on the overall score of
a gadget. The second possible destination is rd, the destination register in the
first instruction of a gadget, for which we assume that this is also the register
an exploit developer is interested in not being modified later on in the same
gadget (in case a memory address is the target there is no active register; in
case of an xchg instruction, both registers are active registers). Modifications
of rd are generally not desirable, but, depending on the modification, can be
reversible, e.g., simple arithmetic. The third possible destination is any other
general purpose register, except rsp and rd, the metric considers all undesirable
side effects and preconditions. Even if they do not affect rsp or rd directly, they
still negatively impact the final score.
Table 2. Rules for grading instructions. Category describes the category of the in-
struction (see Table 1). “RSP”, “rd” and “Other” are possible targets for instructions,
the stack pointer, the destination register of the first instruction of a gadget, or any of
the other general purpose registers respectively. Categories not in the table generally
do not affect the score, with some exceptions discussed in Section 3.4
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2 1 0.5 As opposed to all other instructions in this category, push does not
affect the score of a gadget, since the only side effect it has is on rsp,
and changes to rsp are covered by our rsp monitoring.
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2 1 0.5 Arithmetic instructions that modify a register other than rsp can be
taken into account by the exploit developer. E.g., if r8 should contain
0x40, and a gadget like pop r9 ; add r8, 0x10 ; ret has to be exe-
cuted as the last gadget, the developer can simply make sure r8 contains
the value 0x30 before invoking the last gadget. Arithmetic instructions
modifying rsp are covered by our rsp monitoring.
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te 3 2 0.5 These instructions are handled similarly to arithmetic instructions,
however, they are more difficult to take into account, which is why
they increase the score more than arithmetic instructions.
In a few cases grading all instructions in one category the same does not
make sense and would result in false scoring, which is the reason for the follow-
ing exceptions. Exception #1: Certain instructions that modify rsp need to be
treated differently. This covers all instructions where we can statically determine
the offset applied to rsp. Depending on how much rsp is changed, we adjust the
overall score of the gadget. The details on this are covered in the next subsec-
tion. In case it is not possible to statically determine the offset (e.g., leave or
pop rsp), the overall score of the gadget is increased depending on the category
of the instruction, as presented in Table 2. Exception #2: leave is the only in-
struction in the miscellaneous category that needs to be taken into account, as
it affects rsp. This is taken care of through our rsp monitoring. Exception #3:
Remember from Section 3.1 that we do not cover all of the x86-64 instructions.
This means that in very rare cases (less than 0.1%) we cannot grade a gadget
because it contains an instruction which we did not categorize. We discard these
gadgets from the analysis. Exception #4: If an instruction uses a dereferenced
register as destination its score is increased according to the rules in Table 2, be-
cause this poses a precondition - e.g., the gadget pop r8 ; mov [rdx], 0xfffa
; ret has the precondition that rdx has to point to writable memory before the
gadget can be used.
Monitoring rsp Offset Modifications to rsp need to be tracked for each gad-
get, as explained in the previous paragraph. A short example will make clear why
this is necessary. Assume the following gadget: pop rax ; add rbx, 0x10ff ;
push rcx ; ret. In this case, rsp will point to the value contained in rcx and
jump to this address, which is not the injected address of the next gadget. For
keeping track of the rsp offset the metric uses an SP-Score, SPS, which starts
at 0, is increased for pop and decreased for push and ret n instructions. Of
course, also arithmetic instructions on rsp are monitored and the respective
value is added to or subtracted from SPS. When all instructions in a gadget
have been analyzed and SPS is not 0 this means that rsp does not point to
the next gadget, which might be problematic. Therefore, if SPS is negative, the
overall score of the gadget will be increased by 2. Also, if SPS is large (more
than 4 KiB) or not aligned, the score of the gadget will be increased by 1, be-
cause the former requires an attacker to be able to control more memory and the
latter can be detected easily by exploit mitigation tools. If the instruction that
operates on rsp takes a register and not an immediate (e.g., a add rsp, rcx),
SPS is not changed but the gadget score will be increased by rules in Table 2.
Metric 4 allows one to assess the overall “quality” of a set of gadgets in respect
to side-effects, preconditions, and usability.
3.5 Discussion of the Metrics
We believe that metrics that measure the quality of a set of gadgets should focus
on practical relevance rather than a theoretical concept such as Turing complete-
ness [29]. Furthermore, they should also reflect whether real-world exploits can
be constructed. Since at least Microsoft has seen a shift from classic, stack-based
vulnerabilities to heap-related vulnerabilities [4], we believe that metrics should
still consider both of these classes of attacks. Last but not least, the metrics
should not be limited to well-defined and realistic attack scenarios, but also ex-
press overall gadget quality, i.e., side-effects and preconditions. To summarize,
metrics as described above should:
– Be practical
– Measure if popular current attacks are possible with a given set of gadgets
– Measure if popular past attacks are possible with a given set of gadgets
– Measure gadget “quality”
The proposed metrics achieve all these goals. We would like to stress that our
aim is assessing whether a binary contains gadgets suitable for today’s ROP
attacks. Recently, attacks that use longer and more complex gadgets have been
proposed by researchers [7, 11, 13, 14, 26]. Such attacks are designed to bypass
specific mitigation techniques, which are not used in the real world. Thus, in
current environments, these complex attacks are cumbersome as they offer no
advantage over using regular and simpler ROP gadgets, and we are not aware
of any of these complex attacks being used in the wild.
Because of the lack of practical relevance, we decided not to treat gadgets
potentially useful in such complex attacks differently than the other gadgets.
Nevertheless, if new mitigations limiting the gadgets an attacker may use become
widespread and attackers are forced to use more complex and longer gadgets and
start using tools that assist in finding gadgets semantically rather than through
simple pattern matching, our metrics will have to be updated to reflect this new
environment. This is why we also plan to use a more abstract interpretation of
gadgets and look into leveraging synergies created by combining gadgets in the
future. Furthermore, we also leave an extension to jump-oriented programming
(JOP) [5, 8] for future work.
4 Evaluation
We have implemented the described metrics in a tool named GaLity, which takes
a textfile containing gadgets as input and outputs the metrics we described in
Section 3. We demonstrate that it is both practical and useful by applying it to
binaries that are compiled to use MPX [23], Intel’s latest mitigation technique
against runtime exploits. MPX introduces new registers that contain the lower
and upper bound of a pointer, and instructions that operate on those registers.
This enables compilers to emit additional instructions (MPX and non-MPX)
that tracks the sizes of buffers and accesses to those buffers at runtime, which
can prevent buffer overflows. On processors which do not support MPX, MPX
instructions execute as nop, making MPX compatible with older CPUs, but leav-
ing those binaries unprotected by MPX. Given this observation one thus must
wonder if the increased code size and thus increased availability of gadgets might
actually decrease a binary’s security on such systems. We then compare the re-
sults obtained by applying GaLity to binaries compiled with MPX support with
the results obtained by applying GaLity to the same binaries compiled without
MPX support, and determine which binaries contain more helpful gadgets for
an attacker according to our metrics.
4.1 Implementation
We wrote GaLity in C#. GaLity takes a simple text file that contains gadgets as
input and parses it in four passes, which correlate to the four metrics described
in the previous section. While doing everything in one pass is certainly possible,
we decided to use several passes, as this increases code readability, and perfor-
mance was no issue (even large sets of gadgets containing hundreds of thousands
of gadgets can be analyzed in less than 10 seconds on an Intel Core 2 Duo with 4
GiB RAM). Since current ROP attacks use rather simple gadgets we only recon-
struct the semantic we require for our metrics. For example, GaLity recognizes
the differences between instructions outputting to 64 bit, 32 bit, 16 bit, or 8 bit
(sub)registers and treats them accordingly, but does not recognize that many in-
structions manipulate CPU flags. Knowledge about this would be required when
utilizing more complex gadgets that use conditional branches. However, for cur-
rent real-world attacks, the simpler but less error-prone approach is sufficient.
We looked into using an intermediate representation (IR) which makes side
effects explicit, as this would allow more precise grading. However, we discovered
that, as today’s attacks use simple gadgets, there are few side effects that are
relevant in our scenarios. Therefore, we leave designing an IR tailored to the
very specific requirements of measuring gadget quality, that (1) can be reused
and (2) recognizes more side effects, for future work.
4.2 Setup
To discover gadgets and write them to a file we used ROPgadget 5.48, with
a maximum gadget length of 15. This might sound like a very high number,
however, we did not want to risk potentially missing some useful gadgets. Also,
our metrics ensure that gadgets that do not preserve rd are discarded, i.e., not
considered in the results, and gadgets that have many side effects have a bad
score. Also, for this specific case study we decided to consider duplicate gadgets
and not just unique gadgets, because if an important gadget exists several times
in a binary, this binary is more attractive to an attacker than a binary which
contains only one copy of that gadget. This matters, for example, in a scenario
where a patch (security-related or not) or any other program modification re-
moves said gadget. Furthermore, taking duplicate gadgets into account helps us
measure, if the additional gadgets introduced by MPX are copies of useless or
useful gadgets.
We compiled programs taken from SPEC2006, using Intel’s latest GCC re-
lease with MPX support at the time of writing (5.0.0).9 We decided to use the
SPEC suite because it covers a wide range of application types, and present parts
of real programs. MPX is still new and not integrated too well in build chains,
which made compiling any program a challenge. However, we got the follow-
ing eight programs to work properly: 401.bzip2, 403.gcc, 435.gromacs, 456.hm-
mer, 458.sjeng, 464.h264ref, 473.astar, 482.sphinx3. We compiled all binaries
four times, with and without MPX and with and without optimizations (-O2).
However, for our evaluation we only considered optimized binaries as this reflects
real-world binaries.
8 https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget
9 https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-software-development-emulator
4.3 Results
Table 3. Results forMetrics 2, 3, and 4. Columns rcx, rdx, r8 and r9 denote the number
of gadgets which load a value in the respective register, column pivot denotes the
number of stack pivot gadgets. The first number denotes the number of gadgets without
side-effects, the second number the number of gadgets with side-effects. Column call
denotes the number of gadgets usable for indirect calls. These numbers are required for
computing Metric 2. Column useful denotes the number of useful gadgets, calculated
by Metric 3. Column Q denotes the number of gadgets with a score of 1 or lower,
calculated by Metric 4.
Metric 2 Metric 3 Metric 4
Program rcx rdx r8 r9 pivot call useful Q
h264ref no MPX 4 / 29 1 / 8 1 / 9 0 / 0 0 / 453 62 6,056 3,749
h264ref MPX 7 / 29 0 / 23 1 / 3 0 / 1 0 / 666 91 7,546 4,906
gromacs no MPX 228 / 320 39 / 135 0 / 2 0 / 0 0 / 1071 84 10,823 6,563
gromacs MPX 228 / 418 36 / 141 0 / 7 0 / 1 0 / 1214 155 13,002 8,170
hmmer no MPX 6 / 24 3 / 27 0 / 3 0 / 0 0 / 509 33 5,539 3,303
hmmer MPX 8 / 21 4 / 19 0 / 2 0 / 0 0 / 469 39 6,188 3,952
gcc no MPX 4 / 71 2 / 219 0 / 14 0 / 8 6 / 5295 588 50,766 32,949
gcc MPX 2 / 52 4 / 71 0 / 9 0 / 4 0 / 4337 763 59,522 39,342
sphinx3 no MPX 2 / 14 0 / 11 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 230 29 3,189 1,964
sphinx3 MPX 1 / 11 0 / 7 0 / 0 0 / 0 1 / 251 52 3,484 2,323
sjeng no MPX 1 / 3 0 / 3 0 / 0 0 / 1 0 / 122 72 1,444 983
sjeng MPX 1 / 4 0 / 5 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 137 76 1,982 1,414
astar no MPX 1 / 4 0 / 4 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 122 11 1,009 584
astar MPX 0 / 5 0 / 2 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 140 12 1,203 698
bzip2 no MPX 0 / 1 0 / 1 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 99 13 790 466
bzip2 MPX 0 / 1 0 / 1 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 112 16 987 605
First of all, we noticed that MPX has a big influence on file size. With
no optimizations, an MPX binary is, on average, almost 3 times as large as
a non-MPX binary. With optimization level 2, which we used throughout our
experiments, an MPX binary is still, on average, 86% larger compared to a
non-MPX binary. We noticed that, while the file size increases by a factor of
almost two, the number of gadgets does not increase in the same way, MPX
binaries contain, on average, only 23% more gadgets than non-MPX binaries.
This is because the number of gadgets is directly related to the number of ret
instructions in a binary. MPX does not add many new functions but rather
makes existing functions longer, therefore only few intended new ret instructions
appear. Unintended ret instructions [24] might appear in some cases, however,
since the new opcodes introduced by MPX do not contain a ret opcode, the
possibility for this is rather low.
Analyzing the increase or decrease of gadgets for each category due to MPX,
illustrated in Figure 1, shows that most categories gain gadgets. Arithmetic gad-
gets, which are helpful to an attacker, increase in both number and diversity.
Data-move gadgets grow in numbers, but do not change a lot in respect to diver-
sity. An interesting observation is that NOP-gadgets increase drastically, which
is presumably due to the fact that the new MPX instructions are interpreted
as multi-byte NOPs on hardware that does not support MPX. The categories
flag, string and floating-point have a high standard deviation, indicating that
changes in these categories are very application-specific. Gadgets in the mis-
cellaneous category decrease both in diversity and number. Despite the large
increase of nop gadgets, the overall distribution of gadgets remains roughly the
same, as Figure 2 shows. Overall we conclude that MPX binaries contain more
gadgets in categories helpful to an attacker.
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Fig. 1. This figure shows the average growth of gadgets for each category due to MPX
across all eight applications. The blue bar represents the increase considering only
unique gadgets, while the red bar represents the total increase of gadgets, i.e., also
duplicate gadgets. We use the information about how the number of unique gadgets
changes to infer if and how gadget variety is affected by a program transformation.
Next, we are interested in the two attack scenarios, i.e., Metrics 2 and 3. Re-
gardingMetric 2, there is no big difference in the availability of gadgets. Gadgets
that load arguments in r8 or r9 are rare in both MPX and non-MPX binaries,
and sometimes the MPX binary and sometimes the non-MPX binary contains
some. RegardingMetric 3, the number of useful gadgets increases in every binary
and on average by 17%, making MPX binaries a much more attractive target
to attackers. We summarize the results in Table 3. Lastly, we determine overall
gadget quality using Metric 4. In all eight binaries, the MPX versions contain
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Fig. 2. This figure shows the average distribution of gadgets across all eight applica-
tions. The blue bar represents the non-MPX binaries, while the red bar represents the
MPX binaries.
more gadgets of high quality, i.e., with fewer side-effects and preconditions, as
the last column of Table 3 shows.
By taking all four results into consideration we come to the conclusion, that
binaries compiled with MPX support are favourable for an attacker. Metric 1
shows an overall increase of gadgets in useful categories, further confirmed by
Metric 3, which also shows that the additional gadgets in those categories are
useful in practice. Metric 2 gives no indication that MPX or non-MPX binaries
contain more of the required gadgets. Metric 4 gives the indication that MPX
binaries tend to have more gadgets of higher quality, making them easier to use
for an attacker.
5 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has been done on the topic of
designing a metric to measure the quality of a set of gadgets, even though the
metrics currently used to measure CFI strength are insufficient, exactly because
gadget quality is not expressed by those metrics. Due to this lack of related work,
we introduce the metrics that are currently used to evaluate CFI implementa-
tions, and discuss gadgets required for carrying out attacks against CFI.
Zhang et al. [34] propose using AIR which denotes how many gadgets are
removed, because they are not acceptable targets of indirect branches. However,
AIR does not take into account the quality of the remaining gadgets. Payer et
al. [21] propose DAIR, which works similarly to AIR but is dynamic, hence varies
during program execution. Tice at al. [32] propose forward-edge AIR (fAIR),
which is computed like AIR, but takes into account only forward-edge indirect
control transfers, i.e., calls and jumps. All of the above metrics are limited to
CFI though, and do not consider the quality of the remaining gadgets.
Carlini et al. [6] discuss the effectiveness of CFI implementations against ROP
attacks and propose what they call a basic exploitation test (BET). BET consists
of three generalized attack scenarios, namely arbitrary code execution, confined
code execution and information leakage. They use a minimal program that allows
exploitation, apply several CFI implementations, and evaluate, which of the
described attack scenarios could be achieved. However, this process was done
by a human, hence dependant on skill and knowledge of the exploit developer.
Therefore, it can also not be used for mass-analyzing binaries.
In 2014 and 2015 many attacks targeting various CFI implementations, e.g.,
kBouncer [20], ROPecker [9], or CFI for COTS [34] have been published. As CFI
places tight restrictions on indirect control-flow transfers, hence also gadgets,
those attacks often incorporate gadgets that would rarely be used in real attacks.
E.g., Carlini and Wagner [7], Davi et al. [11], and Go¨ktas¸ et al. [13] discovered
that long gadgets with few side effects are suitable for breaking heuristics-based
mitigations. Such gadgets should consist of at least 20 instructions, preserve as
many registers as possible, have few side-effects, and easily fulfillable precon-
ditions. Gadgets of this length are generally not useful in today’s attacks, and
therefore GaLity does not treat them any different than other gadgets. Another
kind of gadget commonly used in these attacks is an LBR-flushing gadget [7,26].
Recent CPUs have special registers which can be configured to store the ad-
dresses of up to the 16 most recent taken indirect branches [1], which is a feature
kBouncer [20] and ROPecker [9] use. When certain, critical APIs are invoked,
the LBR is inspected and, depending on whether the control-flow appears le-
gitimate or not, an exception is raised. LBR-flushing gadgets are gadgets that
naturally contain many indirect branches, present in the regular control flow,
e.g., functions that call lots of sub-functions. By using such a gadget, the LBR
is filled with legitimate addresses and there is no trace of irregular control flow,
i.e., ROP, in the LBR.
Q [27] allows exploit developers to write a target program in the high-level
language QooL and automatically builds a ROP chain that uses only gadgets
from a provided binary. However, Q handles gadgets with side effects, which we
call preconditions in this paper, very conservatively and discards such gadgets,
potentially removing a large number of useful gadgets. Homescu et al. [15] present
a Turing-complete set of gadgets, using only gadgets that are 3 byte or shorter.
They find that all required gadgets appear very frequently in regular Linux
binaries.
Lastly, there are many tools that assist exploit developers by finding and
sorting gadgets, but none of them take into account the quality of gadgets.
Some of these tools also attempt to automatically build a ROP exploit for one
predefined scenario e.g., ROPgadget10, Mona.py11, or ropper12, however, from
our experience they are not very sophisticated and often fail, even if the necessary
gadgets are available.
6 Conclusion
Return-Oriented Programming forms the cornerstone of many contemporary ex-
ploitation techniques, yet its viability hinges on the availability of useful gadgets.
Program transformations, including exploit mitigation techniques, often do not
take into consideration their impact on the quality and number of gadgets that
they introduce into the binary to which they are applied. Evaluations usually
concentrate on the security gained, but not the security that might be lost due
to a set of gadgets that is now favourable for an attacker than in the original,
unmodified binary.
This work addresses this issue and allows researchers to consider this impor-
tant aspect, by developing a set of metrics that, by combining concrete attack
scenarios and measuring overall gadget quality, cover a wide range of possible
exploit scenarios. We implemented the described metrics in a tool called GaLity,
and applied it to binaries compiled with MPX, a new buffer overflow prevention
technique introduced by Intel. Our results show that MPX provides gadgets of
higher quality, and also a favourable set of gadgets in a concrete attack scenario.
Acknowledgements
We want to express our thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their valu-
able comments. In particular, we want to thank our shepherd, Mathias Payer,
who helped us give this paper its final form. This work was supported by the
BMBF within EC SPRIDE, by the Hessian LOEWE excellence initiative within
CASED, by the DFG Collaborative Research Center CROSSING, by the DFG
Priority Program 1496 Reliably Secure Software Systems, and the project IN-
TERFLOW.
References
1. Intel 64 and ia-32 architectures software developer’s manual combined volumes: 1,
2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3b, and 3c, 2015.
2. M. Abadi, M. Budiu, U´. Erlingsson, and J. Ligatti. Control-flow integrity. In
ACM Conf. on Computer and Communication Security (CCS), pages 340–353,
Alexandria, VA, 2005.
3. J. Aycock. A brief history of just-in-time. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR),
35(2):97–113, 2003.
10 http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
11 https://www.corelan.be/index.php/2011/07/14/mona-py-the-manual/
12 https://scoding.de/ropper/
4. D. Batchelder, J. Blackbird, D. Felstead, P. Henry, J. Jones, A. Kulkarni, J. Lam-
bert, M. Lauricella, K. Malcolmson, M. Miller, N. Ng, D. Pecelj, T. Rains,
V. Sekhar, H. Stewart, T. Thompson, D. Weston, and T. Zink. Microsoft security
intelligence report volume 16, 2013.
5. T. Bletsch, X. Jiang, V. W. Freeh, and Z. Liang. Jump-oriented programming: a
new class of code-reuse attack. In Proc. of the 6th ACM Symposium on Informa-
tion, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS ’11, pages 30–40, New
York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
6. N. Carlini, A. Barresi, M. Payer, D. Wagner, and T. R. Gross. Control-flow bend-
ing: On the effectiveness of control-flow integrity. In 24th USENIX Security Sym-
posium (USENIX Security 15), pages 161–176, Washington, D.C., 2015. USENIX
Association.
7. N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Rop is still dangerous: Breaking modern defenses. In
23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 14), pages 385–399, San
Diego, CA, 2014. USENIX Association.
8. S. Checkoway, L. Davi, A. Dmitrienko, A.-R. Sadeghi, H. Shacham, and
M. Winandy. Return-oriented programming without returns. CCS ’10, pages
559–572, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
9. Y. Cheng, Z. Zhou, M. Yu, X. Ding, and R. H. Deng. Ropecker: A generic and
practical approach for defending against rop attacks. 2014.
10. M. Conti, S. Crane, L. Davi, M. Franz, P. Larsen, M. Negro, C. Liebchen,
M. Qunaibit, and A.-R. Sadeghi. Losing control: On the effectiveness of control-
flow integrity under stack attacks. In Proc. of the 22Nd ACM SIGSAC Conf. on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’15, pages 952–963, New York, NY,
USA, 2015. ACM.
11. L. Davi, A.-R. Sadeghi, D. Lehmann, and F. Monrose. Stitching the gadgets: On
the ineffectiveness of coarse-grained control-flow integrity protection. In Proc. of
the 23rd USENIX Conf. on Security, SEC’14, pages 401–416, Berkeley, CA, USA,
2014. USENIX Association.
12. P. Ducklin. Anatomy of an exploit - inside the cve-2013-3893 internet explorer
zero-day - part 2, 2013.
13. E. Go¨ktas¸, E. Athanasopoulos, M. Polychronakis, H. Bos, and G. Portokalidis.
Size does matter: Why using gadget-chain length to prevent code-reuse attacks is
hard. In Proc. of the 23rd USENIX Conf. on Security Symposium, SEC’14, pages
417–432, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2014. USENIX Association.
14. E. Go¨ktas, E. Athanasopoulos, H. Bos, and G. Portokalidis. Out of control: Over-
coming control-flow integrity. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, SP ’14, pages 575–589, Washington, DC, USA, 2014. IEEE
Computer Society.
15. A. Homescu, M. Stewart, P. Larsen, S. Brunthaler, and M. Franz. Microgadgets:
Size does matter in turing-complete return-oriented programming. In Presented as
part of the 6th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, Berkeley, CA, 2012.
USENIX.
16. M. Jurczyk. One font vulnerability to rule them all #2: Adobe reader rce exploita-
tion, 2015.
17. X. Li and P. Szor. Emerging stack pivoting exploits bypass common security, May
2013.
18. Microsoft. Data execution prevention.
19. A. One. Smashing the stack for fun and profit. Phrack, 7, 1996.
20. V. Pappas, M. Polychronakis, and A. D. Keromytis. Transparent rop exploit mit-
igation using indirect branch tracing. In Proc. of the 22Nd USENIX Conf. on
Security, SEC’13, pages 447–462, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2013. USENIX.
21. M. Payer, A. Barresi, and T. R. Gross. Fine-grained control-flow integrity through
binary hardening. In DIMVA’15: 12th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and
Malware and Vulnerability Assessment, 2015.
22. P. Pi. Unpatched flash player flaw, more pocs found in hacking team leak, 2015.
23. R. Ramakesavan, D. Zimmerman, and P. Singaravelu. Intel memory protection
extensions (intel mpx) enabling guide, April 2015.
24. R. Roemer, E. Buchanan, H. Shacham, and S. Savage. Return-oriented pro-
gramming: Systems, languages, and applications. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.,
15(1):2:1–2:34, Mar. 2012.
25. F. Schuster, T. Tendyck, C. Liebchen, L. Davi, A.-R. Sadeghi, and T. Holz. Coun-
terfeit object-oriented programming: On the difficulty of preventing code reuse
attacks in c++ applications. In 36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(Oakland), 2015.
26. F. Schuster, T. Tendyck, J. Pewny, A. Maaß, M. Steegmanns, M. Contag, and
T. Holz. Evaluating the effectiveness of current anti-rop defenses. In Research
in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses - 17th International Symposium, RAID 2014,
Gothenburg, Sweden, September 17-19, 2014. Proceedings, pages 88–108, 2014.
27. E. J. Schwartz, T. Avgerinos, and D. Brumley. Q: Exploit hardening made easy.
In Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Conference on Security, SEC’11, pages 25–25,
Berkeley, CA, USA, 2011. USENIX Association.
28. F. J. Serna. The info leak era of software exploitation, 2012.
29. H. Shacham. The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without
function calls (on the x86). In Proc. of the 14th ACM Conf. on Computer and
communications security, CCS ’07, pages 552–561, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
ACM.
30. K. Z. Snow, F. Monrose, L. Davi, A. Dmitrienko, C. Liebchen, and A.-R. Sadeghi.
Just-in-time code reuse: On the effectiveness of fine-grained address space layout
randomization. In Proc. of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP ’13, 2013.
31. A. Sotirov. Heap feng shui in javascript, 2007.
32. C. Tice, T. Roeder, P. Collingbourne, S. Checkoway, U´. Erlingsson, L. Lozano,
and G. Pike. Enforcing forward-edge control-flow integrity in gcc & llvm. In 23rd
USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 14), pages 941–955, San Diego,
CA, 2014. USENIX Association.
33. V. van der Veen, D. Andriesse, E. Go¨ktas¸, B. Gras, L. Sambuc, A. Slowinska,
H. Bos, and C. Giuffrida. Practical context-sensitive cfi. In Proc. of the 22Nd
ACM SIGSAC Conf. on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’15, pages
927–940, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
34. M. Zhang and R. Sekar. Control flow integrity for cots binaries. In Proc. of the
22Nd USENIX Conf. on Security, SEC’13, pages 337–352, Berkeley, CA, USA,
2013. USENIX Association.
